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ABSTRACT
The article analyzes the prior appropriation system in the
Western United States as a compelling application of the Coase
Theorem. In the overall prior appropriation system, few statutory
transfers occur, but there are thriving transfer markets in the
smaller-scale context of water districts. This suggests that the
system at large is not at Coase Equilibrium, but that Equilibrium
does prevail inside the water institutions. Institutions facilitate
low transaction costs and secure property rights and catalyze an
iterative process that tends toward Coase Equilibrium. The article
makes policy recommendations regarding the formation of larger-
scale water institutions to reduce deadweight losses by expanding
the scope of Coase Equilibrium within the prior appropriation
system.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes Western U.S. surface water appropriative
rights as a particularly compelling application of the Coase Theorem.
The article postulates two "Coase Conditions," namely that (i)
transaction costs be low' and (ii) property rights of parties to market
exchanges be clearly defined and secure, 2 and defines a "Coase
Equilibrium" in which the Coase Conditions hold and parties have
traded their property rights to achieve an economically efficient outcome
unconstrained by differences, if any, between initial property allocations
and efficient property allocations. 3 This article analyzes why the Coase
* J.D. (with distinction), Stanford Law School, 2004; A.B. (Public & International
Affairs) (summa cun laude), Princeton University, 2000; Associate, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs,
LLP, Louisville, Kentucky. This article originated from a paper written for Professor A.
Mitchell Polinsky's Law & Economics Seminar at Stanford Law School, Spring 2004. While
remaining entirely responsible for any errors or omissions, the author wishes to thank
Professors Polinsky, Barton H. "Buzz" Thompson, Jr., and Charles W. Howe for helpful
research suggestions and thoughtful commentary. The author also thanks the Princeton
Department of Geosciences for invaluable training in natural resource issues and dedicates
this article to his wife, Sarah.
1. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960).
2. Id. at 8, 19.
3. See id. at 7-8, 15-16; Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition of a Surface Water Right
and Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273, 279 (1981).
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Conditions do not hold in the prior appropriation system at large, but
why they have been fulfilled within irrigation districts, and consequently
how Coase Equilibrium characterizes this subset of the prior
appropriation system. The article makes recommendations to answer the
question "How can the Coase Equilibrium, achieved at the irrigation
district level, be enlarged to encompass more of the prior appropriation
system?" The article's Coase-based analysis of surface water use in the
American West and the resulting recommendations are valuable because
they present an opportunity to reduce deadweight losses to society
caused by the prior appropriation system.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
This part discusses the historical background of appropriative
rights, the elements by which rights are established, and the legal
grounds under which rights can be lost. Relating these legal matters to
the implications of the first-in-time, first-in-right nature of the prior
appropriation system, conditions of water scarcity in the American West,
and the prevalence of "paper rights" on most Western rivers, it provides
the necessary context for understanding the reasons for failure of the
Coase Conditions and absence of Coase Equilibrium within the prior
appropriation system.
A. The History of Appropriative Rights and How Appropriative Rights
Are Obtained
The prior appropriation system for surface water allocation in
the American West began in the 1850s when miners arrived and began to
divert water from rivers and streams for use in their sluicing, slurrying,
and similar operations. 4 The traditional legal elements of obtaining an
4. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 32 (2d ed. 1988). See also A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL.,
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 66-70 (5th ed. 2002) (citing Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140
(1855)); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 289 (1990); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property
Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 177-78 (1975); JOSEPH L. SAX ET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES CASES AND MATERIALS 285 (3d ed. 2000) (citing
ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 61-63 (1983)). For a
discussion describing the evolution of prior appropriation systems, see generally id. at 281-
86. Note, however, that adoption of the prior appropriation system was not uniform
throughout the mid-nineteenth-century West. Specifically, early Latter Day Saint
settlements in Utah and "utopian" communities of other European and American settlers
adopted forms of communal ownership of surface water resources, becoming in many
ways the forerunners of the mutual water companies that are still quite significant in
modern Western agricultural water use. See, e.g., id. at 283-84; TARLOCK ET AL., supra, at 70.
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appropriative right are (i) the diversion (ii) of unappropriated water (iii)
from a natural stream (iv) to a reasonable and beneficial use. 5
B. Losing Water Rights
Once obtained and perfected through reasonable and beneficial
use, appropriative water rights are not secure. They can be attacked on
several grounds and lost for various reasons. The most significant ways
in which appropriative rights can be lost include (i) waste, (ii)
abandonment, (iii) forfeiture, and (iv) failure to satisfy the historical use
requirement.6
1. Waste
A subset of the "reasonable and beneficial use" element of an
appropriative right is that the use cannot be "wasteful." 7 Waste is using
water in a manner that creates egregious water loss. 8 Water losses
happen in many forms, including seepage out of unlined irrigation
ditches or evaporation from irrigation canals or furrows. These losses,
however, generally do not by themselves constitute legal waste under
prevailing water law standards. Instead, what constitutes waste is
contextual, with the leading rule being that "an appropriator cannot be
compelled to divert according to the most scientific method known. He
is entitled to make a reasonable use of the water according to the general
custom of the locality, so long as the custom does not involve
unnecessary waste."9 In other words, the waste requirement can be seen
as placing in jeopardy only appropriative rights that are used in a
markedly more wasteful manner than the rights of neighboring
appropriators.
5. See LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAW 27-
28 (1987); TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 161-62, 177-80.
6. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 128 (waste); id. at 208 (abandonment and
forfeiture); id. at 236 (historical use requirement).
7. See, e.g., id. at 12841; Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist.,
45 P.2d 972, 997 (Cal. 1935).
8. Tulare Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d at 997.
9. See generally Tulare Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972. In Tulare, the California Supreme
Court found that seepage losses though unlined irrigation ditches as high as 45% were not
wasteful, because losses through other local ditches ranged between 40% and 57%. This is
striking proof that waste is contextually determined, and that the task, simply, is to not be
markedly more wasteful than one's neighbor.
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2. Abandonment and Forfeiture
Two other significant grounds on which appropriative rights can
be lost are abandonment and forfeiture. Abandonment is a "common
law doctrine involving the occurrence of (1) an intent to abandon and (2)
an actual relinquishment or surrender of the water right." 10 The
appropriator's "intent to abandon must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence of unequivocal acts, and mere nonuse of a water
right, standing alone, is not sufficient for a per se abandonment." 11 While
abandonment may be so difficult to prove that it is rarely relevant,
forfeiture has a lower threshold for placing water rights at risk. Based on
statute rather than common law, forfeiture provides that water rights
may be lost if they are not applied to a beneficial use for a period of five
continuous years. 12 Generally, defenses to forfeiture include (i) the
statutory period may be extended upon a showing of good cause, as long
as application for extension is made within the statutory period; (ii) the
statutory period will not run during the period of any wrongful
interference with a water right; (iii) failure to use the water right because
of circumstances over which the appropriator has no control will not
lead to forfeiture; and (iv) courts in some states will not find a forfeiture
if use of the water right is resumed after the statutory period before any
third parties make a claim on the water.13
3. The Historical Use Requirement
The "historical use" requirement poses another significant
obstacle to secure ownership of appropriative rights. Common to most
Western prior appropriation states, the historical use requirement holds
that "the right to change a water right is limited to that amount of water
actually used beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator's
place of use,"14 or, in other words, "the right to change a point of
diversion, or type, place, or time of use, is limited in quantity by the
10. Jenkins v. State Dep't of Water Res., 647 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Idaho 1982) (citing Sears
v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455,459 (Idaho 1981)); see also RICE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 31.
11. Jenkins, 647 P.2d at 1260-61.
12. Id. at 1260. Five years is the statutory period in Idaho; the applicable time period
may differ from state to state. For example, it is ten years in Colorado. See Beaver Park
Water, Inc. v. Victor, 649 P.2d 300, 303 (Colo. 1982) (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-
402(11)); see also RICE & WHTE, supra note 5, at 31.
13. See Jenkins, 647 P.2d at 1261 (on defenses to forfeiture); see also id. (on resumption of
use as a defense to forfeiture).
14. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo.
1999).
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appropriation's historic use." 15 Santa Fe Trail Ranches Owners Ass'n v.
Simpson, a leading Colorado historical use case, comments explicitly on
the relationship between abandonment and the historical use
requirement, holding that "inquiry into total or partial abandonment is
also germane to a change of water right proceeding."
16
C. "First-in-Time, First-in-Right" and Its Implications
The overall idea of the prior appropriation system is one of "first
in time is first in right." 17 In general, while completing the diversion
perfects the appropriative right, the priority date is nonetheless
established as of the date that the required documentation was filed with
the proper state administrative agency (e.g., the State Water Resources
Control Board in California). 18 As long as the appropriator exercises
"due diligence" in bringing the ditches, canals, or other infrastructure
required for the diversion to completion, the priority date will "relate
back" to the date of the permit application. 19 Failure to meet "due
diligence" requirements can cause appropriators to lose their priority
dates, especially if court proceedings determine that decades passed
before the appropriation was fully used. 20 While the "due diligence"
requirement prevents speculation by holders of unutilized water,
21 it
also encourages a "race to the resource" that can lead to waste and
inefficiency. As will be discussed below, 22 the "due diligence"
requirement often interacts closely with the "historical use" requirement
to create significant transfer-induced title uncertainty for appropriative
rights; this can significantly obstruct transfers, preventing attainment of
Coase Equilibrium.
15. Id. Under Colorado law, for example, the applicant has the evidentiary burden of
showing that the volume of the proposed transfer does not exceed their historical beneficial
use. Id.
16. Id. at 57.
17. GOLDFARB, supra note 4, at 32; Johnson, supra note 3, at 282.
18. SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 104-05.
19. Id.
20. See, for example, State ex rel. Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995), where the court reversed the assignment of a 1907 priority to an entire 84-acre plot,
because only 20 acres of the land had been irrigated in the early period of the century, but
the rest of the land had not begun to be farmed until 1947.
21. SAX ETAL., supra note 4, at 104.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
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D. Prevailing Conditions of Water Scarcity
The American West is a water-scarce region, with rainfall in
many areas west of the one hundredth meridian averaging less than
sixteen inches per year (as contrasted to over 40 inches a year in most
areas east of the Mississippi River). 23 Low levels of precipitation in the
West lead to relatively small riparian flows. For example, the Colorado
River is the second largest river in the West, but is only the twenty-fifth
largest river in the Nation; the Colorado's flow is less than five percent of
the flow in the Mississippi River, the Nation's largest. 24
First in time, first in right interacts with these ongoing conditions
of water scarcity in significant ways. Rights with the earlier priority
dates are "senior" to rights with subsequent priority dates, which are
"junior." When the flow of the river is not enough to meet all
appropriative rights, the burden of the shortage falls completely on
junior appropriators. While senior appropriators are still permitted their
full appropriation, diversions are cut off in inverse order of priority, so
that diversions with the most recent priority dates are the first to be
affected. 25
Applications for appropriation permits were often made at
widely separate times for widely separate locations on a river system. 26
It was in the interest of each appropriator to claim as much water as
possible (e.g., perhaps they were not sure how much their crops would
actually need, and it was much better to overestimate rather than to
underestimate).27 The scattered nature of the permit applications meant
23. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 236-37 (1992) (citing WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH
MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST, commenting on
the early explorer's perception of the West's aridity and unsuitability for agriculture); see
also TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 22, fig. 3; SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 4-5; RICE & WHITE,
supra note 5, at 5; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 261, 267-68 (2000). In the most recent half decade, a severe drought has
prevailed in the West, and water is even more scarce than usual. See Kirk Johnson & Dean
E. Murphy, Drought Settles In, Lake Shrinks and West's Worries Grow, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2004, at Al (quoting U.S. Geological Survey reports that, for the Colorado River, the period
since 1999 is the driest in the 98 years for which records are available).
24. Thompson, supra note 23, at 268.
25. GOLDFARB, supra note 4, at 33. Note the contrast with the riparian system of water
rights prevalent in the Eastern United States, under which each user is allowed a
reasonable amount of water, but under which each user is subject to roughly pro-rata
cutbacks in times of shortage. See, e.g., TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 122-23; Dean Lueck,
The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 427 (1995); Rose,
supra note 4, at 292.
26. SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 108.
27. Id.
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that the process was rarely constrained by objections of other
appropriators. 28 Over time, most Western rivers became substantially
over-appropriated, with the volume of water "officially" appropriated
often far exceeding both the volume of water actually used and the
volume of water physically in the river.29 The unused and/or unfulfilled
appropriative rights are known as "paper rights."
30
E. "Paper Rights" and Insecure Title to Appropriative Rights
The prevalence of "paper rights" on western rivers creates a
background condition that is very important for understanding why, as
a whole, the prior appropriation system fails to achieve Coase
Equilibrium. In nearly every river basin, there is not enough water to go
around, and there is a large class of would-be users that might stand to
benefit if they could demonstrate that more senior appropriators were no
longer (or never had been) entitled to their diversions. Voiding the senior
rights that stand in line ahead of their rights, so to speak, would make
"new" water available to the junior appropriators. Frequently, the legal
doctrines of waste, forfeiture, and abandonment provide grounds for
lawsuits by junior appropriators against senior appropriators.
Conditions of water scarcity and the legal framework by which prior
appropriation rights are established (and, more importantly, lost)
combine to create conditions in which titles to senior water rights are
significantly less secure than they might appear. As discussed below, this
insecurity is usually enhanced when water rights are transferred.
III. STATUTORY TRANSFERS OF APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS
Simply put, statutory transfers of water rights are not easy to
accomplish. 31 This part provides an overview of the statutory transfer
process, explains how the process creates several significant obstacles to
transfers, and analyzes how these restrictions prevent both fulfillment of
the Coase Conditions and achievement of Coase Equilibrium.
28. Id. (i.e., another appropriator challenging the amount of water sought by the
would-be appropriator).
29. Id. at 108-09.
30. Id. at 108.
31. See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine That "First in Time Is First in
Right," 64 NEB. L. REV. 349, 372-73 (1985).
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A. Overview of the Statutory Transfer Process
Appropriators must make applications to state water
administrative agencies or special water courts every time they wish to
change the quantity, point of diversion, location of use, or seasonal time
of use.32 The administrative filings are generally pro forma, but they
initiate a grueling public comment evaluation, and often precipitate
litigation.33 Typically, notices of the proposed transfer are published in
local newspapers, and, in some states, individual notices will also be sent
to local water users, water organizations, and community officials. 34
Opponents of the proposed transfer can then file protests with the state
listing legal grounds for why the change should not be allowed. 35 The
next step is frequently informal negotiations, perhaps under the aegis of
the state water agency; if these fail then there will be a hearing, which
can last anywhere from several hours to several weeks. 36 If there has
been a protest, the applicant-appropriator must prove at the hearing that
the proposed change or transfer will not injure any other appropriator. 37
Almost always, there are complex interconnections between diversions
of upstream appropriators and the "return flows" from these diversions
that are depended upon by downstream appropriators.38 Because of
these interconnections, and because the applicant-appropriator bears the
evidentiary burden of showing that no harm will result from the
proposed change or transfer, the "no-harm" requirement for transfers
can be burdensome. 39 If harm is shown, the transfer will be either
32. SAX Er AL., supra note 4, at 228.
33. Id. at 229.
34. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3, at 284 (discussing the New Mexico transfer process
and that state's publicity requirements); SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 229.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81
CAL. L. REV. 671, 704 (1993).
38. Johnson, supra note 3, at 273; see also RICE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 147-51
(discussing and providing a schematic of the complexities of characterizing return flows).
39. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 37, at 704; SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 230. An
example of a return flow situation would be if there is an upstream appropriator who
diverts 10 cubic feet per second (cfs) to irrigate their field, with 5 cfs of this diversion
flowing back into the river, where it is then diverted again by an appropriator situated
immediately downstream. If the upstream appropriator plans to fallow half their acreage
and transfer half of their water right to an out-of-basin user such as a city, then if the same
diversion-return flow ratio applies, after the transfer only 2.5 cfs of return flow would be
available to the downstream appropriator. The downstream appropriator could protest and
block this hypothetical transfer, which could be approved subject to the condition that all
of the land is fallowed, and 5 cfs is transferred out-of-basin, which will leave the necessary
5 cfs of flow available to the downstream appropriator. For an analysis of problems caused
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blocked outright, or, more frequently, approved subject to modifications
so that return flow appropriators will not be harmed. 40 After the hearing,
the state agency or water court will issue a ruling on the transfer
application, which may be appealed. 41
B. Ways in Which the Statutory Transfer Process Obstructs Transfers
The statutory transfer process discussed above obstructs
transfers in several specific ways. Some of the most important
obstructions are (i) the time and expense entailed in the statutory
transfer process, (ii) the "chilling effect" of the process and consequent
self-screening of potential transfers by would-be transferors, (iii) the de-
facto tax on transfers represented by the process, and (iv) additional
burdens related to the historical use requirement that are triggered by
transfers. 42
1. Time and Cost
The transfer application process can be as brief as one to two
months. On average, however, processing time ranges from six to
eighteen months. 43 More controversial transfers can take several years. 44
Transfers may cost only a few hundred dollars if they are in the "lucky
half" that is not protested, but, if protests do occur, costs escalate rapidly
and can approach $50,000. 45
2. Possible Self-Screening
Because of the no-harm precondition 46 for approval of transfers
and the expense and length of the transfer process, applicant-
appropriators face incentives to carefully evaluate potential transfers
before filing a statutory transfer application. It appears that they act on
these incentives. For example, one study of transfer applications in six
western states between 1975 and 1984 found that fewer than half elicited
by defining water rights in diversion rather than consumption terms, see Johnson, supra
note 3, at 279.
40. Thompson, supra note 37, at 704; SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 230; RICE & WHITE,
supra note 5, at 156-57.
41. SAX Er AL., supra note 4, at 229.
42. See generally Thompson, supra note 37.
43. Id. at 705.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 704-05; see also Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water
Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 973 (1995) (commenting generally on the expense of the
transfer process).
46. See supra note 37 and related discussion.
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protests, and less than ten percent were denied by the applicable state
agency or court.47
3. De-Facto Tax on Transfers
Notwithstanding this empirical data, it would be a mistake to
conclude that the burdens of the statutory transfer process do not have a
significant impact on the transferability of appropriative water rights.
48
For example, a study of transfers in Colorado and New Mexico estimated
that the statutory transfer process added $300 per acre-foot (20%) to the
$1500 per acre-foot cost of water purchases.49 The cost of the statutory
process is relatively invariant with the volume of the proposed transfer.
Small and medium-volume transfers, therefore, are disproportionately
deterred, because fixed administrative and dispute-resolution costs are
spread over a smaller volume of water.50 Due to the high time and
monetary costs of the statutory transfer process, transfers are not only
formally blocked following application but also informally deterred by
the process's very existence. 5'
4. Obstructions Related to the Historical Use Requirement
The historical use requirement, like abandonment, waste, and
forfeiture, is a threat to the security of water rights. While each of the
latter three legal doctrines potentially poses risks to unlucky
appropriators at any time, the historical use requirement poses
significant risks only when transfers are proposed. Santa Fe is explicit
regarding the antagonistic relationship between transfers and the
historical use requirement:
the fundamental purpose of a change proceeding is to
ensure that the true right-that which has ripened by
47. LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL, THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT
OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS 47-48 (1990).
48. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 37, at 707 (noting that "the sheer hydrologic
uncertainty involved in determining whether a transfer will affect downstream
appropriators will inevitably produce sizeable administrative costs").
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id.
51. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less in Securities Class Actions? (Mar.
2004) (unpublished manuscript presented to the Stanford Law School Spring 2004 Law &
Economics Seminar), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558 28 5 (last visited Feb. 27,
2005), and Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989), as examples of the law and economics
literature discussing how increased dispute resolution and/or litigation costs decrease the
volume of claims that will be brought before administrative agencies and/or courts for
resolution.
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beneficial use over time -is the one that will prevail in its
changed form.... "The public policy of this state is to keep
the public water resource available to those who can and
will use it beneficially, as opposed to those who wish to
speculate in its value and price...."-2
By its very nature, a dispute turning on historical use will be
fact-intensive, often requiring determination of patterns of planting and
diversion from several decades in the past.5 3 Historical records are
frequently insufficient for this task,54 and the controversy may devolve
into an expensive and uncertain "battle of the experts." This is another
reason that the historical use requirement adds to the expense of the
legal and administrative aspects of the transfer process. 55
C. Interactions Between Legal and Pragmatic Obstacles to Transfers
The legal environment that potential applicant-appropriators
often confront can deter them from seeking to implement transfers of
appropriative rights. The application process can be lengthy, particularly
if the transfer is protested.5 6 Furthermore, to gain approval of the
transfer, the applicant-appropriator must meet the evidentiary burden of
showing that the transfer will not harm any other appropriators. 57
Finally, the applicant-appropriator must also meet the evidentiary
burden of showing that the volume of the proposed transfer will not
exceed their historical beneficial use.58
The various pragmatic obstacles to transfers associated with or
caused by these legal requirements can also be substantial. First, the
application process can be quite expensive, especially if a protest is filed
and litigation ensues.59 Second, because approval of transfers can
sometimes be rescinded if unexpected harm occurs after approval is
granted, transfers have an undesirable lack of finality; transferees do not
52. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55 (Colo. 1999)
(quoting Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1270
(Colo. 1998)).
53. RicE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 74.
54. SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 268-70 (commenting on Wyoming as a case study of the
frequent discrepancies between state water rights records and real-world patterns of water
use).
55. SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 236.
56. Thompson, supra note 37, at 705.
57. See supra note 37 and related discussion.
58. See supra Part II.B.3 (regarding the historical use requirement).




know if transferred water will continue to be available, even after a
transfer has secured initial approval. 60 Third, and most importantly,
initiating the statutory transfer process lessens the de facto security of an
appropriator's water right.61
1. Legal obstacles to transfers
Conceptually, waste, abandonment and forfeiture are always
potential concerns for appropriators. Waste, however, is measured by
the community norm standard, under which water is not wasted so long
as an appropriator does not egregiously depart from the practices of
nearby appropriators. 62 Therefore, in a practical sense, waste is not a
very significant source of title insecurity for appropriative rights. The
situation changes markedly, however, when a transfer application is
filed with an administrative agency. Public notice provisions, typically
incorporated into the transfer process, 63 give local appropriators the
impression that an applicant has "extra" water available. The question
naturally arises -why? Other appropriators may claim that the applicant
has recently taken steps to curtail water waste or, more to the point,
60. SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 229; see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a
Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 67 (1970). Evaluating
his analysis of the economics of a fishery, Cheung commented that "transfer of property
rights among individual owners through contracting in the marketplace requires that the
rights be exclusive.. .without some enforced or policed exclusivity to a right of action, the
right to contract so as to exchange is absent." Id. at 67. Cheung went on to observe that the
"absence of exclusivity in property may be due to the absence of recognition by legal
institutions of that exclusivity." Id. Cheung would surely have considered his comments
applicable to transfers in the prior appropriation system. The doctrines of waste, forfeiture,
abandonment, and the historical use requirement all combine to partially (but not fully)
and unpredictably undercut the exclusivity of water rights, in that what an appropriator
believes is theirs to transfer may not actually be theirs, if aspects of their appropriative
right are successfully challenged during the transfer application process. The failure of
exclusivity in water rights is partial rather than total, which may be why transfers are only
partially (but not completely) blocked.
61. See Johnson et al., supra note 3, at 288. Johnson et al. focused their analysis on New
Mexico transfers and downplayed the significance of "obstacles to the efficient transfer of
water," instead emphasizing that "[ilt is not the appropriative system that is at fault but
rather the manner in which rights are defined within that concept." Id. As a partial
solution, Johnson et al. urged that water rights be defined with respect to consumption
rather than diversion. Id. In other words, of the two Coase Conditions that fail in the prior
appropriation system at large, it is insecurity of property rights rather than high transaction
costs that is the more important variable in the failure to reach Coase Equilibrium. See Scott
& Coustalin, supra note 45, at 964 (discussing lack of exclusivity as the reason for
insufficient definition of appropriative water rights).
62. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1010
(Cal. 1935).
63. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 229.
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claim that the water was never actually put to any beneficial use.64 If so,
then the applicant must clear the hurdles of abandonment and forfeiture.
The transfer may still, however, run afoul of the "no-harm" requirement
if it would negatively impact existing appropriative rights (i.e., by
changing a pattern of return flows to which other appropriators have
become accustomed). In sum, then, the legal doctrines by which
appropriative rights may be lost present greater obstacles to transfer
than they do to possession of the rights.
2. Pragmatic Obstacles to Transfers
Ex ante, an applicant can reasonably anticipate that the transfer
application may entail considerable time and expense and may not
succeed. Recall, also, the incentives created by prevailing conditions of
water scarcity and the existence of a large class of "thirsty" holders of
"paper rights." These would-be water users are standing next in line and
can get the water they need, if only they can knock the senior
appropriator out of his place in line ahead of them. Fundamentally,
many would-be transferors understand that, if they opt not to transfer,
their rights are reasonably secure, but if they choose to transfer their
water, rather than use it according to customary patterns, they are asking
for trouble. The evidentiary burdens of proving waste, abandonment,
forfeiture, or a historical use violation create a structure that typically
protects appropriators who do not transfer their water. The legal
structure is not only biased against transfers 65 -it also jeopardizes the
security of appropriative rights retained by appropriators who do
attempt transfers. Furthermore, transfers place the applicant's entire
appropriation, rather than just the portion proposed for transfer, at risk
of being lost.66 The risk that a proposed transfer may be blocked, wasting
the time and expense involved, deters transfers, but the risk of losing
retained rights may be an even more significant deterrent. When the
stakes are so high, maintaining the status quo and opting not to pursue
transfers is the safer option.67
64. This would violate the historical use requirement. See discussion Part II.B.3, supra.
65. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo.
1999).
66. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745, 750-51 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995).
67. See SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 236, for a good discussion of a hypothetical transfer
problem integrating the several anti-transfer incentives discussed above.
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3. Low Number of Statutory Transfers: An Empirical Effect of These Obstacles
Because of the interaction between the legal and pragmatic
obstacles to statutory transfers, 68 few transfers are initiated or approved
(consequently, existing patterns of surface water use are preserved). This
is more than a theoretical result of the prior appropriation system -it is
an empirically observed outcome. Studies indicate that transfers are
rare:69 in the 1970s and 1980s, formal transfers averaged less than five
per year in Arizona, California, and Wyoming; about sixty per year in
New Mexico; over 100 per year in Colorado; and over 300 per year in
Utah.70
D. Obstacles to Transfer and the Absence of Coase Equilibrium
Analyzing the legal and pragmatic obstacles to statutory
transfers demonstrates that, in the prior appropriation system as a
whole, the Coase Conditions do not hold, because transaction costs are
high and title to water rights is insecure. Contrasting aspects of the prior
appropriation system with the conditions prevailing in Robert
Ellickson's famous study of cattle trespass in Shasta County provides a
better understanding of why the Coase Conditions fail.
71
1. Ellickson's Shasta County Study and the Coase Conditions
Ellickson's study found that a group of Shasta County,
California, landowners, farmers, and cattle ranchers had reached Coase
Equilibrium, because their patterns of grazing and cultivating remained
constant.72 This constant persisted even as background legal rules
relating to trespass changed back and forth from "open" to "closed"
range.73 In the Shasta County study, the Coase Conditions were met.
First, transaction costs were low, in great part because of community-
wide norms, close community ties, and the residents' propensity to use
68. See discussion Part III.C.2, supra.
69. See Rodney T. Smith, Water Transfers, Irrigation Districts, and the Compensation
Problem, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 446, 447 (1989).
70. Note, however, that, even in Utah, the state with the greatest number of statutory
transfers, only one to two percent of the water supply changed hands each year. See SAX Er
AL., supra note 4, at 226 (citing MAcDONNELL, supra note 47); see also Thompson, supra note
37, at 703-08 and accompanying footnotes.
71. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 628 (1986).
72. Id. at 686.
73. Id.
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nonlegal methods of dispute resolution. 74 Second, property rights to the
resources in question were clear and secure. It was obvious who owned
the trespassing cattle and the land that was being trespassed upon. 75
Also, in the Shasta County study, there was not a large class of potential
litigants who would be allowed to trespass or obtain damages for
trespass, once other ranchers or farmers who "stood ahead of them in
line" were displaced. This condition lowered incentives to sue and
contributed to fulfillment of the second Coase Condition- the security of
property rights (whether formally or informally, as norms).
2. The Prior Appropriation System and the Coase Conditions
Juxtaposing Ellickson's findings against the prevailing
conditions in the prior appropriation system produces a stark contrast.
With respect to appropriative water rights, the Coase Conditions are not
fulfilled. First, transaction costs are not low, let alone near zero. To the
contrary, they are high enough to be a significant deterrent to all but
those applying to transfer very large volumes of water. Second, property
rights in water resources are insecure in some rather significant ways
(e.g., waste, abandonment, forfeiture, and the historical use requirement).
Because the Coase Conditions are not fulfilled, it is reasonable to
conclude that the prior appropriation system as a whole is not at Coase
Equilibrium, and that this lack of Coase Equilibrium causes economic
inefficiency. 76 Empirical data on the very low numbers of transfers
supports this conclusion.
Concededly, it is true that failure of the Coase Conditions and
the resultant lack of Coase Equilibrium do not by themselves prove that
transaction costs and insecure property rights are leading to
economically inefficient outcomes. Another theoretical possibility, which
can be called "Perfect Initial Allocations," posits that the initial allocation
of property rights was so appropriate that no corrective transfers are
necessary, and that, notwithstanding changed conditions since the initial
distribution of property rights, the "initial perfect allocations" continue
74. Id. at 672-73 (community norms), 676-77 (self-help and relational sanctions,
particularly gossip), 680-81 (aversion to litigation).
75. Note, however, that Ellickson called into question whether the purely "legal" rules
of trespass were very relevant to the outcomes he observed. See id. at 685-86. There were
clear alternatives to legal rules, however, in the form of deep-seated local trespass norms.
Id. at 686. Consequently, the "right thing to do" (a substitute for who, precisely, owns
what) was usually clear to Shasta County residents. This permitted the second Coase
Condition to hold.
76. Cheung, supra note 60, at 68 (cautioning that, "without transfer, the highest-valued
option may not be realized"); see also Berger, supra note 31, at 373.
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to be optimal.77 As demonstrated, 78 this alternative explanation for the
small quantity of transfers (and the concomitant assertion that resulting
deadweight losses are avoided) is incorrect.
IV. ABSENCE OF COASE EQUILIBRIUM CAUSES DEADWEIGHT
LOSSES
An analysis of the prevailing pattern of Western water use
indicates that there is a dramatic mismatch between water users who
place the highest marginal value on their water (typically, cities) and
appropriators who hold the most senior rights from more reliable
sources (typically, farmers). The reasons for this pattern of water use are
largely historical. For the most part, miners, ranchers, first-stage farmers,
and latter-stage farmers obtaining water under long-term subsidized
contracts with the Federal Bureau of Reclamation 79 preceded the rapid,
and then near-explosive, post-World War II western urbanization.80
Today, the mines are largely played out, and the ranching is often
marginal. Farming is still a big business, but the marginal value of water
in agriculture is markedly less than the marginal value of water for new
residential developments and industrial activities. 81 Under the prior
appropriation system, however, the higher-valuing urban and industrial
users of water are the newest arrivals, and therefore have the least secure
claims on the resource.
Even this brief historical view of the prevailing patterns of
Western water use indicates that the "Perfect Initial Allocations"
hypothesis is incorrect. In reality, the lack of transfers cannot be
explained away by an assertion that no transfers need to occur. To the
contrary, there is a strong, widespread consensus that transfers,
especially "ag-urban" trades between farmers and cities, could create
77. Cf. Coase, supra note 1, at 19 (suggesting a theoretical possibility of the existence of
a perfect initial allocation in which no value-enhancing transfers are necessary, and in
which the absence of transfers would not be proof of deadweight losses). But see L.M.
HARTMAN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE
INSTITUTIONS 13 (1970) (remarking that "present [statutory] transfer procedures do not lead
to an efficient allocation of water resources except fortuitously").
78. See discussion Part IV, infra.
79. Jim Carlton, Is Water Too Cheap? As Contract Renewals Loom, Environmentalists, Tax
Group Call for Farmers to Pay More, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2004, at B1.
80. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 37, at 701-02.
81. See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 79 (noting that San Jose, California, pays $80/acre foot
for its municipal water, but that farmers using water provided by the Bureau of
Reclamation's Central Valley Project pay only $10/acre foot).
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significant economic value.82 It is fair to conclude, however, that the
failure of the Coase Conditions caused by high transaction costs and
insecure property rights prevents a profusion of transfers that would
otherwise occur. The deadweight losses that result could be avoided if
unrestrained transfers were permitted to generate an "equilibrium in
which the marginal value of the water [was] equal across all users." 83
Although a greater volume of transfers could prevent many, or even
most, of these deadweight losses, the losses will continue so long as the
Coase Conditions fail, preventing Coase Equilibrium in the prior
appropriation system at large.
V. COASE EQUILIBRIUM WITHIN IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The failure of the Coase Conditions and the absence of Coase
Equilibrium within the prior appropriation system are marked by an
interesting and significant exception -irrigation districts.
. 82. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 69, at 446-47; Thompson, supra note 37, at 676, 701-02;
SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 224-25 (noting that reducing Arizona agricultural water use by
five percent could permit a population increase of 1.5 million, or 50 percent of the state's
1985 population, and that reducing irrigation-related consumptive use in Colorado by five
percent would nearly double the amount of water available for municipal and industrial
uses); DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 211-17; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in
the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1990); TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 225; WILKINSON,
supra note 23, at 285; Charles W. Howe et al., The Performance of Appropriative Water Rights
Systems in the Western United States During Drought, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 385 (1982);
Zach Willey & Tom Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States- An Agenda for Economic
and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 325, 328 (1988) (indicating that year 2000
consumptive uses of fresh water in the United States were projected to be 95.1 billion
gallons per day (bgd) in the agricultural sector, but only 24.2 bgd in the commercial,
manufacturing, and domestic sectors combined, meaning, for instance, that a five percent
reduction in the amount of agricultural consumption would permit a 19.6% increase in the
amount of water available for "urban" needs).
83. Lueck, supra note 25, at 429. Lueck correctly noted (i) that the return flow from each
diversion is a public good; (ii) that transferors will impose externalities on other
appropriators if a transferor is allowed to transfer more than the fraction of their
appropriation that is consumptively used; and (iii) that when water rights are "defined
only over diversion, the stream value will not be maximized through unrestricted trading if
return flows differ among users." Id. at 429-30 (citing Johnson, supra note 3). The public-
good nature of return flows is probably the economic rationale underlying the "no-harm"
requirement imposed on transfers, as well as the justification for placing the burden of
proving "no-harm" on the applicant-appropriator, ensuring that they do not appropriate
the public good to themselves. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 82, at 379 (citing HARTMAN, supra
note 77); see also Part III, supra.
Winter 20051
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
A. The Importance of Irrigation Districts
Irrigation districts and other water institutions play a very
significant role in the delivery of Western agricultural and urban water -
providing water for between 35 percent and 50 percent of the irrigated
acreage and about 90 percent of domestic users. 84 Water institutions can
be "retail" or "wholesale." 85 "Retail" water for agriculture is typically
provided by mutual water companies or quasi-governmental water (or
irrigation) districts.8 6 Just as individual users can be members of a retail
district, several retail districts are often members of the larger
wholesaling districts, creating a "nested" array of water institutions.8 7
B. Modification of Water Rights to Achieve Uniform Intra-District
Rights
Inside a typical water district, appropriative rights are altered
from their traditional form. Sometimes, individual water users served by
a district continue to own their water rights, but more often, the district
is the legal owner of the rights and the users are the equitable owners. 8
Usually, the water district is permitted to divert the water for beneficial
use anywhere within the boundaries of the district.89 Defining the water
rights held by the district at this level of generality provides enhanced
flexibility, because submission of transfer applications (with attendant
costs and procedural obstacles) is not required when water is transferred
from one intra-district use to another. 90
Although the typical district holds water rights with varying
priorities, within the district, members' water allotments are uniformly
defined. 91 District members may hold or obtain varying quantities of
water allotments, usually depending on the amount of acreage they own
84. Thompson, supra note 37, at 686.
85. Id. at 687.
86. Id.
87. Id.; cf. Olivia S. Choe, Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era
of Scarcity, 113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1943-49 (2004) (discussing "nested enterprises" in the Eastern
United States in comparison to the "umbrella model" of water institutions in the Western
United States.).
88. Thompson, supra note 37, at 695; see also Howe, supra note 82, at 386 (describing an
arrangement in Colorado under which the Federal Bureau of Reclamation sells water from
its Colorado-Big Thompson project to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
and District members can sell water entitlements within the District's service area without
resort to statutory transfer processes).
89. Thompson, supra note 37, at 695.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 710.
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within the district, but each intra-district allotment is interchangeable
and fungible. 92 Intra-district allotments can be allocated either through
intra-district transfers, or through pricing mechanisms where each
season users buy units from the district according to their anticipated
needs.93
C. Large Volumes of Intra-District Transfers
There are significant obstacles to statutory transfers within the
prior appropriation system at large94 and, consequently, relatively few
statutory transfers. Within irrigation districts, however, there are an
incredible number of transfers and volume of water transferred. 95 A
typical prior appropriation state has dozens or even hundreds of
irrigation districts,96 and within each of these districts, in turn, there may
be hundreds of transfers. 97 Indeed, within California's Westlands Water
District during one year in the early 1990s, there were nearly 4500
transfers. 98 Although complete data is not available, it appears that
transfers involving irrigation districts (institutional transfers) affect a
much larger fraction of total surface water flows than statutory
transfers. 99 Within districts, these institutional transfers undoubtedly
ameliorate the otherwise-harsh consequences of the all-or-nothing water
availability that would otherwise prevail in an over-appropriated, water-
scarce prior appropriation system. Institutional transfers also avoid the
inflexibility of an enforced pro-rata intra-district sharing rule that
districts might have to enforce in dry years.100 In years both dry and wet,
some crops or other water uses will produce higher marginal benefits
than others. Intra-district transfers, at least on a local scale, accommodate
92. Id.
93. Id. at 710-13.
94. See discussion supra Part 11.
95. Thompson, supra note 37, at 713-14 (noting that "small-scale studies suggest that
institutional transfers far outnumber the few statutory transfers that occur each year in the
average state").
96. California, for example, has 230 public water districts. Id.
97. Id. (citing studies tallying over 1000 transfers, totaling over 16,000 acre-feet, in just
six Colorado water districts, and between 290 and 629 transfers each season between four
Utah districts).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 714 (noting studies indicating that annual statutory transfers totaled one
percent of New Mexico water rights and 1.5% of Utah water rights, but that annual
institutional transfers totaled 5.6% of Colorado districts' supplies, 29% of Utah districts'
supplies, and 7.6% of the supply available to California's Arvin-Edison Water Storage
District).
100. Id. at 696.
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this reality. The system equilibrates the marginal valuations of water by
users and minimizes deadweight losses.10 1
D. Districts Fulfill the Coase Conditions and Reach Coase Equilibrium
The thousands of institutional transfers occurring each year
within prior appropriation states is evidence that, at least in water
districts, the Coase Equilibrium prevails. According to theory,
Equilibrium would not be possible unless the Coase Conditions were
fulfilled. Analysis of institutional transfers confirms this hypothesis.
1. Lower Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are much lower for intra-district transfers than
they are for statutory transfers 10 2 (which tends to fulfill the first Coase
Condition). It is easy to see why this is the case. In the first instance, to
the extent districts allocate water through pricing mechanisms, these
naturally operate at a remarkably low cost. 10 3 In the second instance, to
the extent districts allocate water through intra-district transfers, these
also operate at much lower cost than the statutory transfer system.104
Institutional transfers have lower costs than statutory transfers for two
primary reasons. First, because the district continues to hold legal title to
the appropriative rights both before and after transfer of the water
allotment, no statutory transfer is necessary, saving time and expense. 10 5
Second, districts have fewer difficulties in measuring return flow. Within
institutions, runoff usually flows into common ditches or an underlying
aquifer. Therefore, both before and after an institutional transfer, return
flows are accessible to the institution, so transfers do not jeopardize the
water supply of other users within the institution.10 6
2. Reduced Transfer-Related Title Insecurity
As for the second Coase Condition, institutional transfers cause
less title insecurity than statutory transfers. Institutional transferors face
a lower risk that they will lose part or all of their appropriative right on
grounds of waste, forfeiture, abandonment, or the historical use
101. Id.
102. Id. at 710 (noting the "search" and "pricing" cost reductions enabled by uniform
intra-district allotments and the "clearinghouse" activities of districts).
103. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIc THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
ExTENSIONs 513-14 (7th ed. 1998).
104. Thompson, supra note 37, at 712.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 713.
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requirement. There are several reasons why this is the case. First,
institutional transferors are not required to notify other district members
of a proposed transfer. 10 7 As a result, fewer people are aware of the
transfer; thus, the potential class of plaintiffs who might protest the
transfer is smaller. Second, there is likely a solidarity and community of
interest among the farmers within an irrigation district that might not
exist among an entire group of appropriators on a river. Irrigation
districts serve a limited area, so transferors and transferees are one's
friends and neighbors rather than perceived "outsiders." This situation
within a water district resembles the situation analyzed in Shasta County
by Professor Ellickson.10 8 Even if relations between water district
members are not entirely cordial, the typical community within a water
district nonetheless calls to mind the "relationship preservation" work of
Professor Macaulay, Professor Charny, and others of the "Wisconsin
School." 109 Within a water district, there may be hundreds of transfers on
average each year, and the district member who today believes one of his
fellow members is profiting from the transfer of "wasted" water may
tomorrow become party to a transfer himself. In this context of repeated
interaction, simple game theory predicts that cooperation, rather than
conflict, is the utility-maximizing equilibrium, and empirical observation
confirms this hypothesis.110
Third, within the typical water district, the transferee party
generally faces the greatest water scarcity (otherwise, they would have
been outbid by another district member).," Because they are able to buy
the water they need within district boundaries, their incentive to seek
water supplies through a more challenging statutory transfer is reduced.
The situation contrasts with a traditional statutory transfer from a senior
rights holder to a somewhat junior rights holder, in which the transferee
may not be the party facing the greatest water scarcity or the party
willing to pay the highest price for the water. In a statutory transfer
situation, there may be "paper rights" holders waiting in the wings
107. Id.
108. See supra note 71 and related discussion.
109. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACr LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 255 (4th ed. 1999) (citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions
in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990)).
110. See supra note 97 and accompanying discussion (showing a large quantity of
cooperative transfers rather than confrontational litigation).
111. Note that the "clearinghouse" role of water institutions permits them to come
much closer to matching willing sellers and willing buyers at a single equilibrium price
than would be possible in a statutory transfer alternative, where private-party deals might
happen at a range of prices, and some would-be water users might not succeed in making
their consumer preferences known.
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whose only opportunity to obtain water in a first-in-time, first-in-right
system is to exploit the transfer, challenging the transferor's
appropriative rights on grounds of waste, abandonment, forfeiture, or
the historical use requirement. In contrast, challenges to institutional
transfers within a water district do not bring "new" water into the closed
system. This reduces incentives to challenge institutional transfers.
E. Economic Analysis of How Institutional Transfers Reduce Title
Insecurity
An incentive model for litigation created by Professors Cooter
and Rubinfeld helps explain why incentives to contest institutional
transfers are much less than incentives to contest statutory transfers. 112
Cooter and Rubinfeld model potential litigants' decisions to bring suit as
a function of the cost of filing the claim, bringing the claim through trial,
and the expected benefits to be obtained.11 3 When the expected benefits
decline, and the costs of bringing and litigating claims increase, the result
will be less litigation.114 This insight from the Cooter-Rubinfeld model is
the starting point for a line of reasoning indicating that institutional
transfers are much more conducive than statutory transfers to fulfillment
of the second Coase Condition and attainment of Coase Equilibrium.
1. Statutory Transfers: Lower Early-Stage Litigation Costs for Plaintiffs
The obstacles to even filing a claim against institutional transfers
exceed those facing statutory transfers. First, statutory transferors are
required to provide notice of proposed transfers; institutional transferors
are not.11 5 This reduces the costs to potential plaintiffs, because a
statutory transferor must bear the cost of making the plaintiffs aware of
the transfer, and therefore of the possibility of a claim. In contrast,
institutional transfers do not have notice provision requirements, so the
potential plaintiff must bear the costs of determining whether events
have occurred that may hurt their interests. Second, institutional
transfers do not involve the legal transfer of water rights because title
continues to be held by water districts. Therefore, with respect to
institutional transfers, individual water users and would-be plaintiffs
may lack standing to sue, as they are (technically) not the appropriators.
112. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
113. Id. at 1089.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 34, 107, and accompanying discussion.
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2. Statutory Transfers: Lower Later-Stage Litigation Costs
Beyond the cost of filing claims, the cost to plaintiffs of litigating
claims against statutory transfers is likely less than against institutional
transfers. For statutory transfers, transferors bear the burden of
measuring return flows and demonstrating that the proposed transfer
will not harm other appropriators. 116 Plaintiffs need only challenge the
evidence offered by transferors, 1 7 and this can reasonably be expected to
cost less than constructing a case of their own. For institutional transfers,
the burdens are reversed and plaintiffs do not have the same relative cost
advantage. Foreseeably, this will increase plaintiffs' litigation costs for
challenging institutional transfers relative to their costs for challenging
statutory transfers.
3. Relationships Between Transfer Size, Litigation Costs, and Litigation
Incentives
Whether institutional or statutory, litigation costs incurred in
challenging a transfer are probably relatively invariant with the size of
the proposed transfer." 8 This is important because of the interaction
between transfer costs, transferors' decisions to transfer, and third
parties' decisions whether to challenge transfers. When transfer costs are
lower, they can be spread over transfers of smaller volumes of water
without making the smaller transfers cost-prohibitive. More transfers
will occur, and, on the margin, transferors will pursue smaller-sized
transfers. As transfer costs fall, average transfer size can be expected to
decline, and the numbers of relatively small transfers can be expected to
increase.
The size of the transfer being challenged represents the potential
payoff for prospective challengers of the transfer.119 Litigation costs
facing would-be challengers, however, are relatively fixed without
respect to the size of the challenged transfer. Therefore, as transfer
volume declines, it is less likely that protests offer anticipated benefits in
116. See supra note 37 and accompanying discussion.
117. See supra note 35 and accompanying discussion.
118. This may not be the case with larger transfers, which tend to relate to larger tracts
of land. In such a case, it may be more expensive to characterize and quantify return flows.
119. If the challenge succeeds and the transferor loses their entire appropriative right, as
in State ex rel. Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), and if the
challenger is the first "paper right" in line to benefit from the "new" water lost by the
transferor, the payoff is direct. If the challenge succeeds and the transfer is reduced in




excess of projected costs. Consequently, fewer lawsuits will be brought,
and the likelihood that a given transfer will be challenged declines.
With respect to institutional transfers, however, a "virtuous
cycle" develops in which lower transaction costs result in an increased
number of small transfers. 120 Smaller-sized transfers offer lower expected
payoffs from litigation, which reduces the fraction of the transfers that
are challenged. Accordingly, transaction costs shrink and the "virtuous
cycle" continues. A similar "vicious cycle" runs in reverse for statutory
transfers, creating a feedback loop in which higher transfer costs lead to
increasing average transfer size, raising average expected litigation
payoffs, causing challenges to a greater share of transfers, which
increases transfer costs, continuing the undesirable cycle.
F. Aspects of Coase Equilibrium in Statutory and Institutional
Transfers
The difference between the "virtuous" institutional transfer cycle
and the "vicious" statutory transfer cycle may reflect an underlying truth
of the Coase Theorem: property rights systems may have bimodal stable
equilibria. In other words, a system at Coase Equilibrium in which the
Coase Conditions hold may tend towards an even stronger equilibrium.
Transaction costs decrease and property rights are more secure, as
cheaper transfers lead to a greater number of transfers and smaller
average transfer size, making transfers less vulnerable to litigation. In
contrast, a system at anti-Equilibrium in which the Conditions do not
hold may move ever farther from Equilibrium. Property rights are less
secure because expensive transfers lead to a smaller number of larger-
volume transfers, making the average transfer more vulnerable to
litigation and increasing transaction costs. Furthermore, a system with
middling transaction costs and middlingly secure property rights may
not stay that way for long. Events will probably tip the system toward
one of the bimodal equilibria, from which it can be dislodged only with
the greatest difficulty.
VI. EXPANDING COASE EQUILIBRIUM WITHIN THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
The foregoing analysis of the prior appropriation system at large
and irrigation districts has several implications. Due to historical
patterns of settlement in the American West, rapid population growth,
120. See discussion supra Part V.C.
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and prevailing water scarcity, the current situation is not one of "Perfect
Initial Allocations." On the contrary, the marginal value of water is not
equal across various uses and to all users, with significant deadweight
losses being the predictable result. Transfers could create significant
value, but they are quite constrained in the prior appropriation system at
large. Statutory transfers are constrained because of the failure of the
Coase Conditions, in that (i) transfer costs in time and money are high
and (ii) statutory transfers make title to appropriative water rights less
secure, as transferors' rights can be challenged on grounds of waste,
fraud, abandonment, and the historical use requirement. In contrast,
institutional transfers are flourishing. 121 Water institutions appear to
have attributes that are favorable to fulfillment of the Coase Conditions
and achievement of Coase Equilibrium. If the successes of water
institutions at the irrigation district level can be replicated under the
aegis of larger-scale water institutions, a much larger fraction of the prior
appropriation system might be brought towards Coase Equilibrium,
reducing deadweight losses and creating economic value. In other
words, the prior appropriation system at large is relatively inflexible, but
institutions demonstrate significant flexibility. Linking existing
institutions and/or creating new, larger institutions can provide the
flexibility necessary to increase efficiency in water use in the American
West, without requiring wholesale revision of the prior appropriation system
(which is unlikely from the standpoint of political feasibility, and may
also be undesirable). 122
A. Imagining Successful Larger-Scale Water Institutions
A larger-scale water institution might create significant value by
facilitating Coase Equilibrium between (i) low-valuing, high-priority,
supply-secure users (farmers) and (ii) high-valuing, low-priority, supply-
121. For example, transfers in the context of irrigation districts, mutual water
companies, and other similar water institutions.
122. Howe, supra note 82, at 388; see also SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 316 (discussing
constitutional protection for existing water rights under the Fifth Amendment's takings
clause); Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577 (Okla.
1990); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 172 (1996) ("[Wiater rights are not 'lesser' or
'diminished' property rights unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. Water rights, like other
property rights, are entitled to the full protection of the Constitution."). But see SAX ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 333 (noting that the courts have been "very deferential to governmental
water regulation," notwithstanding frequent takings challenges by appropriators affected
by the regulations). On how weakening the security of appropriative rights might harm
development of emerging water markets, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water
Rights, in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 43, 43-44 (Kathleen Carr & James
Crammond eds., 1995) (cited in SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 334).
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insecure users (cities).123 The larger-scale institution (the District) would
allow more "ag-urban" trades to occur. Large "ag-urban" trades are a
live issue in the current prior appropriation system. For example, a 1998
agreement between the behemoth Imperial Irrigation District (ID) and
the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) provided for the
conservation and sale by IID of up to 200,000 acre-feet per year for
urban, industrial, and residential uses in the SDCWA service area.124
Large "ag-urban" trades are often subject to extensive disputes
and litigation. In the case of the IID-SDCWA transfer, the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWDSC), a junior appropriator to
the IID, asserted that IID was trying to sell water that it had been
wasting; MWDSC claimed that IID was therefore not entitled to the
water.125 The controversy was projected to reach a negotiated resolution
in which junior appropriators would agree to accept the transfer and not
sue IID for waste during the proposed lease period. 126
1. How the District Might Fulfill the Coase Conditions
The District might be able to facilitate "ag-urban" trades in the
following ways. First, it would lower transaction costs, making "ag-
urban" trades common. The District would serve as an information
broker and clearinghouse,127 just as water institutions do at the irrigation
district level. Furthermore, legal title to appropriative rights would be
held by the District, with the "ag" rights and the "urban" rights
converted to allotments held by each side to the transfer (paralleling
current practice at the irrigation district level). This system would
prevent the need for repeated use of the statutory transfer process.
Processing trades faster by avoiding the statutory transfer system would
lower transaction costs and move conditions within the District towards
fulfillment of the first Coase Condition.
Second, the District would alleviate transfer-induced title
uncertainty. Because the District would hold legal title to a fixed amount
123. See, e.g., Scott & Coustalin, supra note 45, at 971-76 (envisioning the future role of a
hypothetical larger water institution they call a "river corporation"). Scott and Coustalin's
primary focus for the "river corporation" was on governance and regulation of the riparian
resource, but a secondary focus included the facilitation of transfers among a wider range
of appropriators on a river. Id. at 973-74. They noted that the "river corporation" was an
"institutional innovation" of current irrigation districts and other water institutions. Id. at
972.
124. SAX ETAL., supra note 4, at 150.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Scott & Coustalin, supra note 45, at 974 (noting that the "river corporation"
could, among other roles, act as a clearinghouse for short-term transfers).
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of appropriative rights; suing institutional transferors for waste,
abandonment, forfeiture, or failure of the historical use requirement
would not make "new" water available to district members. Capping the
supply of water available to potential litigants in this manner would
reduce the litigation incentives that are present in a statutory transfer.
Also, as long as no non-transferee "paper rights" holders (such as
MWDSC) are let into the District, the universe of potential litigants who
would wish to challenge the institutional transfers would be reduced.
128
In addition, avoiding the statutory transfer process would start a
"virtuous cycle" of lower transfer costs and smaller transfers. 129 After
spreading relatively fixed litigation costs over progressively smaller
volumes of water (and anticipated benefits from litigation), fewer
transfers would be worthwhile to contest through administrative action
or litigation. As these factors interacted to reduce litigation, title
insecurity would decrease and, progressively, the second Coase
Condition would become more fulfilled.
2. Intangible Aspects of the District and Fulfillment of the Coase Conditions
In several intangible ways, the District might reduce title
uncertainty, litigation, and the number and severity of challenges to
water transfers. A water institution benefits both farmers and cities,
protecting them from litigation and providing a more reliable water
supply, or a way to turn unneeded water into extra revenue. Through
joint association, members may come to view one another as partners,
rather than adversaries in the ongoing contest for diminishing water
resources. This potential for the District to change the "sociology" of
interaction between cities and farmers is reflected in the observation of
Shasta County cattleman Chuck Searle, cited by Professor Ellickson: "I
think the whole thing is good neighbors. If you don't have good
neighbors, you can forget the whole thing." 130 Through the District,
farmers and cities would watch each other benefit from increased
transfers. Ultimately, they might come to view each other as "good
neighbors" with whom they want to cooperate, rather than adversaries
whom they want to sue.131
128. In comparison, transferee "paper rights" holders (such as SDCWA) would be
proponents, rather than challengers, of the transfers because they are parties to the
transfers.
129. See discussion supra Part V.
130. Ellickson, supra note 71, at 624.
131. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 151-52 (1996), for a
discussion, rooted in transaction cost economics, of reputation effect mechanisms that
dramatically increase possibilities for trust and cooperation when commercial interactions
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B. Potential Pitfalls to Avoid in Designing Larger-Scale Water
Institutions
It is important to ensure that the cohesiveness of irrigation
district-scale water institutions is not lost in the larger-scale District.
Smaller water institutions are cohesive in large part because, even if a
given district member does not profit from a particular institutional
transfer, the odds are high that they will be party to one in the future.
The equilibrium solution is to agree to others' transfers, to increase the
chances that one's own future transfers will not be contested. When
transfers become less frequent and larger, however, as is common for
"ag-urban" transfers, new "rent-seeking" problems arise, as irrigation
district members dispute who will enjoy the financial gains from the
transfers. 132 These rent-seeking disputes dissipate the gains that would
otherwise accrue from transfers, and perhaps even keep them from
occurring.133 This result could be avoided through implementation of a
clear plan for how transfers will be processed within the District and
who will obtain the gains from the transfers.
become repeat games rather than isolated, "one-shot" events. See also Scott & Coustalin,
supra note 45, at 973-74 (discussing how the "river corporation" could both avoid and
mediate transfer-related disputes, thereby increasing comity among appropriators on the
river).
132. See, e.g., SAX, supra note 4, at 150 (discussing the MWDSC-IID controversy cited
above at note 124).
133. Thompson, supra note 37, at 732; Richard L. Bowen et al., Rent Seeking, Wealth
Transfers and Water Rights: The Hawaii Case, 31 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 429, 432, 445-46 (1991)
(discussing rent-seeking issues arising in Hawaii water transfers and political wrangling
between landowners, urban residents, real estate developers, and public interest groups
over the financial windfall from hypothetical ag-urban trades between sugar producers
and growing urban areas); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72-73 (1987) (commenting that "transaction costs frequently do impede
efficient bargains" and that "instances in which strategic bargaining does inhibit efficient
results are legion"). For a discussion of why internal organization (by analogy, possibly, a
water institution) is superior to "market modes of contracting" (by analogy, possibly, the
statutory transfer process) "in circumstances where opportunism and small-numbers
conditions are joined," see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-29 (1975). There is an opportunism problem in the prior
appropriation system as a whole because there are small-numbers conditions: empirically
there is not a "rivalry among large numbers of bidders" to buy or sell water that will
"render opportunistic inclinations ineffectual." Id. Williamson notes "transactional
dilemmas" associated with the opportunism facilitated by small-numbers conditions such
as increased bargaining costs and indirect costs (presumably, such as litigation). Id.
Williamson's insights certainly apply to the prior appropriation system and are another
way of describing failure of the Coase Conditions: when opportunism is unconstrained,
transaction costs will rise and property rights will become less secure. In contrast, within
water districts, there is a much more competitive market to buy and sell water, which
reduces the small-numbers problem and constrains opportunism.
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1. The Tender Offer Model
Rodney Smith, a leading thinker about water transfers and
markets, proposes a tender offer model for water transfers as a solution
to rent-seeking by irrigation district members. 134 Under this model or
one similar to it, the transferee (city) requests to buy a certain amount of
water from transferors (farmers) at a certain price.135 If would-be
transferors oversubscribe the tender offer, then water is bought pro-rata
from each farmer that tenders.136 If transferors undersubscribe the offer,
then the city makes a new tender at a higher price, until the city obtains
the full amount of water it needs.137 Alternatively, irrigation districts
(that would be members of the larger District) can act as intermediaries
in the tender offer for their individual farmer-members. 38 To that end,
they notify members of the transfer opportunity, manage and quantify
return flows, and reduce the number of transferors with whom the city
must transact. 139
The tender offer system has several merits. If a city wishes to do
a once-off transaction without using a tender offer approach, then
would-be transferors who cannot participate will be denied liquidity and
might not perceive a readily available future opportunity to transfer (as
they commonly have in an irrigation district). Litigation might be a
relatively attractive option for these frustrated would-be transferors. In
contrast, if more transferors benefit financially from the transfer, then the
pool of potentially disgruntled claimants is smaller.
1 40
Furthermore, a common concern related to large "ag-urban"
trades is that the transfers may hurt the "area of origin" of the






140. See, e.g., Bowen et al., supra note 133, at 447. Bowen et al. discuss an "auction
solution" to the rent-seeking problems of hypothetical ag-urban trades in Hawaii, in which
the state government would auction water rights to the highest bidders. The efficiency in
allocation would be similar to that achieved by the tender offer model, but under Bowen's
proposal, the rents would accrue to the state rather than to private appropriators as
proposed by Smith. Both the auction and the tender offer would facilitate fulfillment of the
Coase Conditions by lowering transaction costs and more clearly delineating property
rights. The different financial impacts on the public and private sectors under each
proposal provide a clear demonstration of how initial resource allocations determine
revenue flows but not patterns of resource utilization when systems are at Coase
Equilibrium; see also Sterk, supra note 133, at 73 (implying that efficient bargains are more
likely to be made in competitive markets than in bilateral-monopoly situations in which
transaction costs are higher).
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transferred water, and that farming communities and rural areas may
see their economies decline as land is fallowed, while a small number of
farmer-transferors accrue the gains to themselves, without compensating
their neighbors for the negative externalities. 141 The tender offer
approach, however, permits the economic efficiency of large "ag-urban"
trades while minimizing the dislocations to farmers and rural areas
caused by systemic change in the marginal value of water within
different economic sectors. The tender offer approach reduces
dislocations from "ag-urban" trades because several water districts sell a
small percentage of their water, rather than a few districts selling a much
larger fraction of their water. The same amount of agricultural land is left
to fallow, but over a much larger area. Redeployment of economic
resources is spread out over space and time, minimizing politically
unpopular and poignant third-party effects. Reducing third-party effects
is pragmatic as well as humanitarian, because the rural and farming
lobby is politically powerful. The tender offer model spreads the
financial benefits of water transfers more broadly throughout this lobby,
reducing the intensity of their political mobilization against transfers.
This lowers transaction costs and makes the project more feasible. 142
2. The District and Transition Issues
Ideally, the larger District, designed to expand Coase
Equilibrium within the prior appropriation system, joins a large city or
coalition of cities and several irrigation districts. Its members have access
to a common water supply and delivery infrastructure typical to Bureau
of Reclamation projects. The city-transferee members of the District
would work with the farmer-transferors to determine how much water
could conceivably be transferred from each of the irrigation districts, net
of return flows. A single large statutory transfer application for this
amount of water would be made. Litigation might result, but protests
should be significantly reduced if the District is carefully designed so
that junior, supply-insecure appropriators anticipate financial benefits
141. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 196, 246. Criticism of third-party effects of water
transfers may be misplaced. Ag-urban trades are symptomatic of larger structural changes
in the Western U.S. economy, as water resources become more highly valued in urban and
industrial uses than in agricultural ones. Other U.S. economic sectors such as
manufacturing have undergone profound structural changes in recent decades, often at
very high costs to communities, workers, and other third parties. Nonetheless, there has
not been a strong effort to prevent these changes; it may make little economic sense to take
a different course with Western water. See id. at 248-49; Thompson, supra note 37, at 734.
Nonetheless, as long as the same efficiencies can be achieved, from a social welfare
standpoint it is desirable to minimize dislocations.
142. See Thompson, supra note 37, at 733-35.
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and senior, supply-secure appropriators anticipate liquidity
opportunities from selling their unneeded water through a tender-offer
process. 143 Once the District processes this single large statutory transfer,
a water "line of credit" is in place. Then, the District may begin to
facilitate a large volume of short, medium, and long-term trades for
small, medium, and large volumes of water using a tender offer
model.144 As transaction costs are reduced and property rights become
more secure, the Coase Conditions are fulfilled and a Coase Equilibrium
would emerge, just as it has in smaller-scale water institutions. 145
Applying institutional transfer procedures in the District would
preserve and expand price-based signals for resource allocation in the
water market, allowing flexible responses to seasonal fluctuations in
water availability and agricultural prices, and longer-term responses to
growing urban populations. 146 The District reduces third-party effects on
farmers and communities in the transferor areas as much as possible for
farmers, while increasing flexibility for cities.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the tradition of Professor Ellickson's study of Shasta County
cattle trespass, this Article analyzes the prior appropriation system in the
Western United States as a compelling application of the Coase Theorem.
The paucity of statutory transfers in the system at large juxtaposed
against the profusion of institutional transfers within water districts
suggests that the overall system is not at Coase Equilibrium. The Coase
Equilibrium does prevail, however, in the smaller-scale institutional
context. Institutions facilitate fulfillment of the two Coase Conditions
that are required for Coase Equilibrium: low transaction costs and secure
143. In contrast, recent "ag-urban" transfers such as the IID-SDCWA transaction left
junior appropriators such as MWDSC "out in the cold," with large incentives to sue.
144. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 82, at 388 (calling for establishment of a "state or
interstate agency" much like the District proposed in this Article that would "make a
market" in water rights by providing pricing information, brokering transfers, and making
whole third parties -presumably other appropriators -whose interests were harmed by
transfers).
145. See discussion supra Part V.
146. One foreseeable issue with increasing the freedom with which water now used
within irrigation districts can be marketed to cities (who will pay a higher price for it) is
that many current transferee farmers within the irrigation districts wish to maintain
artificially low prices for water by keeping demand for the water limited to in-district uses.
Hopefully, the tender offer model will reduce this problem, because all farmers (even those
who now use institutional markets to buy water that is cheaper than its real value on an
open market) would stand to benefit from selling water through the District to urban
transferees. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 37, at 736-37.
Winter 20051
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
property rights. Institutions catalyze a "virtuous cycle" in which lower
transaction costs (the first Coase Condition) increase the number and
reduce the average size of transfers. This, in turn, reduces opportunities
and incentives for litigation, making appropriative rights more secure
(the second Coase Condition) and lowering transaction costs.
Consequently, more transfers become possible in an iterative process
that tends toward Coase Equilibrium. Policies encouraging application
of small-scale institutional transfer models on a larger scale and
facilitating the formation of larger-scale water institutions will expand
Coase Equilibrium within the prior appropriation system. Bringing cities
and irrigation districts together into larger "supra-institutions" can lower
transaction costs and, if done correctly, reduce the pool of potential
litigants against transfers, making appropriative rights more secure.
With respect to Western U.S. surface water use, the Coase
Theorem's operation and consequences are just as clear as they were in
Ellickson's Shasta County study. As the West's population and economic
activity continues to expand, however, the stakes are much higher. There
has never been a better time to apply Coase's central insights to the U.S.
prior appropriation system -expanding the successes of the existing
institutional framework to a larger level, reducing deadweight losses
caused by legacies of Western history, and increasing efficiency in the
allocation of the West's most coveted natural resource.
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